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abstract
THRUPUT II is a linear programming model developed at the Naval Postgrad-
uate School for the U.S. Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency (AFSAA) to
help improve the efficiency of the airlift mobility system. It determines the
maximum on-time throughput of cargo and passengers that can be transported
with a given aircraft fleet over a given network, subject to appropriate physi-
cal and policy constraints. THRUPUT II was used in the analysis provided by
AFSAA to the C-17 Defense Acquisition Board in November, 1995. This pa-
per reviews the model's formulation, describes its use in the C-17 analysis, and
reports extensions that have been developed since the model's first appearance.
1 Introduction
This paper is a status report on a multi-year research effort to apply optimization modeling
technology to the analysis of strategic airlift mobility. The purpose of the research is to
help the U.S. Air Force improve logistical efficiency. Optimization is used to determine the
maximum on-time throughput of cargo and passengers that can be transported with a given
aircraft fleet over a given network, subject to appropriate physical and policy constraints.
The model can be used to help answer questions about selecting airlift assets and about
investing or divesting in airfield infrastructure.
The primary model discussed in this paper is called THRUPUT II, which was introduced
in a Naval Postgraduate School Masters thesis [Lim, 1994] and further developed in a
Military Operations Research article [Morton, Rosenthal, and Lim, 1996]. Since those earlier
publications were written, THRUPUT II provided inputs to the C-17 Defense Acquisition
Board, decision of November 1995. This experience and other subsequent developments are
covered here. A new model is currently under joint development between NPS and the
RAND Corporation [Melody et al, 1996]. The distinguishing features of this new model are
discussed in the conclusion.
The progenitors of THRUPUT II were the first THRUPUT, developed at the Air Force
Studies and Analysis Agency [Yost, 1994]; and the Mobility Optimization Model (MOM),
developed at the Joint Staff's Force Structure Resource, and Assessment Directorate (J8)
[Wing et al, 1991]. All of these models are implemented with the General Algebraic Mod-
eling System (GAMS) [Brooke, Kendrick and Meeraus, 1992].
Examples of the types of mobility questions that can be analyzed with optimization are:
For a given fleet and a given network,
• Are the aircraft and airfield assets adequate for the deployment scenario?
• What are the impacts of shortfalls in airlift capability?
• Where are the system bottlenecks and when will they become noticeable?
This type of analysis can be used to help answer questions about selecting airlift assets
and about investing or divesting in airfield infrastructure. Such analyses are accomplished
through repeated runs of the model. Each run assumes a particular scenario as defined by
a given set of time-phased movement requirements and a given set of available aircraft and
airfield assets. It is then solved for optimal values for the number of missions flown, and
the amounts of cargo and passengers carried, for each unit, by each aircraft type, via each
route, in each time period.
After describing the optimization model in Sections 2 and 3, Sections 4 and 5 discuss
analyses performed in the recent non-developmental aircraft alternative (NDAA)/C17 study.
Finally, a special- purpose algorithm for solving large problem instances and a modeling
extension to incorporate aircraft reliability are described in Section 6.
2 Overview of Model
In this section we give a conceptual overview of the airlift optimization model. Then,
Section 3 provides a detailed mathematical formulation. Sections 2 and 3 can be skipped
by readers familiar with [Morton, Rosenthal, and Lim, 1996].
2.1 Model Features
The model has been designed to handle many of the airlift system's particular features
and modes of operation. For example, the payload an aircraft can carry depends on the
maximum leg distance of a mission (shorter mission legs allow greater payloads), and aircraft
with heavy loads may be required to make frequent enroute stops. Also, there is a need to
ensure cargo-to-carrier compatibility since some military hardware is too bulky to fit into
certain aircraft. These features have been incorporated in the model to make it as realistic
as possible. Others, such as the use of tanker aircraft for aerial refueling of airlift aircraft,
incorporating crews, and modeling intra-theater shuttles and ground transportation are the
subject of the follow-on model mentioned earlier. The major features of the airlift system
currently captured by the model include:
• Multiple origins and destinations: In contrast to MOM, the current model allows the
airlift to use multiple origin, enroute and destination airfields.
• Flexible routing structure: The air route structure supported by the model includes
delivery and recovery routes with a variable number of enroute stops (usually between
zero and three). This provision allows for a mixture of short-range and long-range
aircraft. The model can thus analyze trade-offs between higher- payload, shorter-
range flights and lower- payload, longer-range flights. For further routing flexibility,
the model also allows the same aircraft to fly different delivery and recovery routes
on opposite ends of the same mission.
• Aircraft-to-route restrictions: The user may impose aircraft-to-route restrictions; e.g.,
only military aircraft may use military airfields for enroute stops. This particular
provision arises because the USAF Air Mobility Command (AMC) may call upon
civilian commercial airliners to augment USAF aircraft in a deployment, under the
Civil Reserve Airfleet (CRAF) program. The model distinguishes between USAF and
CRAF aircraft.
• Aircraft assets can be added over time: This adds realism to the model, because
CRAF and other aircraft may take time to mobilize and are typically unavailable at
the start of a deployment.
• Delivery time windows: In a deployment, a unit is ready to move on its available-to-
load date (ALD) and has to arrive in the theater by its required-delivery-date (RDD).
This aspect of the problem has been incorporated in the model through user-specified
time windows for each unit. The model treats the time windows as "elastic" in that
cargo may be delivered late, subject to a penalty.
2.2 Conceptual Model Formulation
The primary decision variables are the number of missions flown, and the amounts of cargo
and passengers carried, for each unit, by each aircraft type, via each available route, in each
time period. Additional variables are defined for the recovery flights, for aircraft inventoried
at airfields, and for the possibility (at high penalty cost) of not delivering required cargos
or passengers.
2.2.1 Objective Function
The purpose of the optimization model is to maximize the effectiveness of the given airlift
assets, subject to appropriate physical and policy constraints. The measure of effectiveness
is the minimization of total weighted penalties incurred for late deliveries and non-deliveries.
The penalties are weighted according to two factors: the priority of the unit whose movement
requirement is not delivered on time, and the degree of lateness. The penalty increases with
the amount of time late, and non-delivery has the most austere penalty.
The anticipated use of the model is for situations when the given airlift resources are
insufficient for making all the required deliveries on time. On the other hand, if there
are enough resources for complete on-time delivery, then the model's secondary objective
function is to choose a feasible solution that maximizes unused aircraft. The motivation of
the secondary objective is that if the available aircraft are used as frugally as possible, while
still meeting the known demands and observing the known constraints, then the mobility
system will be as well prepared as it can be for unplanned breakdowns and unforeseen
requirements, such as additional contingencies.
2.2.2 Constraints
The model's constraints can be grouped into the five categories: demand satisfaction, air-
craft balance, aircraft capacity, aircraft utilization, and airfield handling capacity.
• Demand Satisfaction Constraints: The cargo demand constraints attempt to ensure
for each unit that the correct amounts of cargo move to the required destination within
the specified time window. The passenger demand constraints do the same for each
unit's personnel. The demand constraints have elastic variables for late delivery and
non-delivery. The optimization will seek to avoid lateness and non-deliveries if it is
possible with the available assets, or to minimize them if not.
• Aircraft Balance Constraints: These constraints keep physical count of aircraft by
type (e.g., C17, C5, C141, etc.) in each time period. They ensure that the aircraft
assets are used only when they are available.
• Aircraft Capacity Constraints: There are three different kinds of constraints on the
physical limitations of aircraft - troop carriage capacity, maximum payload, and cabin
floor space - which must be observed at all times.
• Aircraft Utilization Constraints: These constraints ensure that the average flying
hours consumed per aircraft per day are within AMC's established utilization rates
for each aircraft type.
• Aircraft Handling Capacity at- Airfields: These constraints ensure that the number of
aircraft routed through each airfield each day is within the airfield's handling capacity.
2.3 Assumptions
Some major assumptions of the model are listed below. These are known to be sacrifices of
realism, but such assumptions are needed in modeling most real-world problems due to the
limitations of data availability or the need to avoid computational intractability.
• Air Force planners use a measure called Maximum-on-Ground (MOG) to represent air-
field capacity. The literal translation of MOG as the maximum number of planes that
can be simultaneously on the ground at an airfield is somewhat misleading, because
the term MOG means more than just the number of parking spaces at an airfield.
In actuality, airfield capacity depends on many dimensions in addition to parking,
including material handling equipment, ground services capacity and fuel availability.
Some Air Force planners use the terms parking MOG and working MOG to distin-
guish between parking space limits and servicing capability. Working MOG is always
smaller than parking MOG, and is the only MOG for which we have data. Working
MOG is an approximate measure because it attempts to aggregate the capacities of
several kinds of services into a single, unidimensional figure. Disaggregation of airfield
capacity into separate capacities for parking spaces and for each of the specific services
available would yield a more accurate model. Ongoing projects at AMC [Schubert.
Whisman, and Steppe, 1996] and RAND [Stucker, 1996] involve stochastic and de-
terministic simulations, respectively, whose purpose is to determine appropriate, and
possibly multidimensional, MOG values. The model presented here will benefit from
these investigations.
• Inventoried aircraft at origin and destination airfields are considered not to affect the
aircraft handling capacity of the airfield. This assumption is not strictly valid since an
inventoried aircraft takes up parking space, but, as noted, working MOG dominates
parking MOG.
• Deterministic ground time: Aircraft turnaround times for onloading and offloading
cargo and enroute refueling are assumed to be known constants, although they are
naturally stochastic. This ignores the fact that deviations from the given service time
can cause congestion on the ground. To offset the optimism of this assumption, an
efficiency factor is used in the formulation of aircraft handling capacity constraints
to cushion the impact of randomness. Then, in Section 6, we describe a stochastic
optimization formulation that explicitly models stochastic ground times and indicate
how this optimization model has been linked with a discrete-event simulation.
Other approximations of reality employed in the model for computational tractability
are aggregation of airfields, discretization of time, and continuous decision variables. A
limitation on the scope of the model is that it considers only inter-theater, not intra-theater
deliveries.
3 Optimization Model
This section gives a mathematical formulation of the conceptual model outlined above.
The airlift optimization model is formulated as a multi-period, multi-commodity network-
based linear program (LP) with a large number of side constraints. Two key concepts
are employed in the model. The first is the use of a time index to track the locations of
aircraft for each time period. The modeling advantages of knowing when an aircraft will
arrive at a particular airfield are that it enables us to model aircraft handling capacity
at airfields and to determine unit closure (i.e., the time when all of a unit's deliveries are
complete). This approach is in contrast to the THRUPUT model of [Yost, 1994], which
takes a static-equilibrium or steady-state approach.
The second key concept is model reduction through data aggregation and the removal
of unnecessary decision variables and constraints prior to optimization. This is necessary as
the airlift problem is potentially very large. Without this model reduction step, the number
of decision variables would run into the millions, even for a nominal deployment. The
unnecessary decision variables and constraints are removed by extensive checking of logical
conditions, performed by GAMS during model generation. This is discussed in greater
detail in Section 5.
3.1 Indices
u indexes units, e.g., 82nd Airborne
a indexes aircraft types, e.g., C17, C5, C141
t, t' indexes time periods
b indexes all airfields (origins, enroutes, and destinations)
i indexes origin airfields




B set of available airfields
I C B origin airfields
K C B destination airfields
Aircraft Index Sets
A set of available aircraft types
Abulk Q A aircraft capable of hauling bulk-sized cargo
Awer Q A-buik aircraft capable of hauling over-sized cargo
Aout Q Aover aircraft capable of hauling out-sized cargo
Bulk cargo is palletized on 88 x 108 inch platforms and can fit on any military aircraft
(as well as cargo-configured CRAF). Over-sized cargo is non- palletized rolling stock: it is
larger than bulk cargo and can fit on a C141, C5 or C17. Out-sized cargo is very large
non-palletized cargo that can fit into a C5 or C17 but not a C141.
Route Index Sets
R set of available routes
Ra C R permissable routes for aircraft type a
Rab Q Ra permissable routes for aircraft type a that use airfield b
Rau Q Ra permissable routes for aircraft type a carrying cargo or troops for unit u
DRi C R delivery routes that originate from origin i
RRk Q. R recovery routes that originate from destination k
A delivery route is a route flown from a specific unit's origin to its destination for the
purpose of delivering cargo and/or passengers. A recovery route is a route flown from a
unit's destination to that unit's or some other unit's origin, for the purpose of making
another delivery. Since recovery flights carry much less weight than deliveries, the recovery
routes from k to i may have fewer enroute stops than the delivery routes from i to k.
Time Index Sets
T set of time periods
Tuar possible start times for aircraft of type a flying a mission for unit u on route r
The set Tuar covers the allowed time window for unit u, which starts on the unit's
available-to-load date and ends on the unit's required delivery date, plus some extra time
up to the maximum allowed lateness for the unit.
3.3 Given Data
Movement Requirements Data






Equipment movement requirement in short tons (stons) for unit u
Proportion of unit u cargo that is bulk-sized
Proportion of unit u cargo that is over-sized







Lateness penalty (per ston per day) for unit u equipment
Lateness penalty (per soldier per day) for unit u troops
Non-delivery penalty (per ston) for unit u equipment
Non-delivery penalty (per soldier) for unit u troops
Maximum allowed lateness (in days) for delivery
Penalty (small artificial cost) for keeping aircraft type a in mobility
system at time t
Cargo Data
UESqFtu Average cargo floor space (in sq. ft.) per ston of unit u equipment









Number of aircraft of type a that become available at time t
Maximum troop carriage capacity of aircraft type a
Average cargo space (in sq. ft.) consumed by a unit u soldier for aircraft
type a
Cargo floor space (in sq. ft.) of aircraft type a
Cargo space loading efficiency (< 1) for aircraft type a. This accounts for
the fact that it is not possible in practice to fully utilize the cargo space.
Established utilization rate (flying hours per day) for an aircraft of type a
Airfield Data
MOGCapbt Aircraft capacity (in narrow-body equivalents) at airfield b in time t
MOGReqab Conversion factor to a narrow-body equivalent for an aircraft of type a at
airfield b
MOGEffbt MOG efficiency factor (< 1), to account for the fact that it is impossible
to fully utilize available MOG capacity due to randomness of ground times
Aircraft Route Performance Data
MaxLoadar Maximum payload (in stons) for aircraft type a flying route r
GTimeabr Aircraft ground time (due to onload or offload of cargo, refueling,
maintenance, etc.) needed for aircraft type a at airfield b on route r
DTvmeabr Cumulative time (flight time plus ground time) taken by aircraft type a
to reach airfield b along route r
FltTimear Total flying hours consumed by aircraft type a on route r
CTimear Cumulative time (flight time plus ground time) taken by aircraft type a
on route r
DaysLateuart Number of days late unit u's requirement would be if delivered by
aircraft type a via route r with mission start time t
3.4 Decision Variables
Mission Variables
Xuart Number of aircraft of type a that airlift unit u via route r with mission start
time t
Yart Number of aircraft of type a that recover from a destination airfield via route r
with start time t
Aircraft Allocation and De-allocation Variables
Allotait Number of aircraft of type a that are allocated to origin i at time t
Releaseait Number of aircraft of type a that were allocated to origin i prior to time t
but are not scheduled for any missions from time t on
Aircraft Inventory Variables
Hait Number of aircraft of type a inventoried at origin i at time t
HPakt Number of aircraft of type a inventoried at destination k at time t
NPlanesat Number of aircraft of type a in the air mobility system at time t
Airlift Quantity Variables
TonsUEuart Total stons of unit u equipment airlifted by aircraft of type a via route r
with mission start time during period t
TPAXuart Total number of unit u troops airlifted by aircraft of type a via route r
with mission start time during period t
Elastic (Nondelivery) Variables
UENoGou Total stons of unit u equipment not delivered in the prescribed time frame
PAXNoGou Number of unit u troops not delivered in the prescribed time frame
Each of the decision variables is constrained to be non-negative.
3.5 Formulation of the Objective Function
in inimize ^^ ^ V^ LatePenUEu DaysLateuart TonsUEuart
+ YY1 Yl Yl LatePenPAXu DaysLateuart TPAXuar ,
" a r£Ra t£Tuar
+ J2(N°GoPenUEu UENoGou + NoGoPenPAXu PAXNoGou )
u
+ 2_]
/~" Preserveat - NPlanesat
a t
The DaysLateuart penalty parameter has value zero if t + CTimear is within the pre-
scribed time window for unit it. Thus, the first two terms of the objective function take
effect only when a delivery is late. The third term in the objective function corresponds
to cargo and passengers that cannot be delivered even within the permitted lateness. Late
delivery and non-delivery occur only when airlift assets are insufficient for on-time delivery.
The reason for including elastic variables that allow late delivery and non-delivery is to
ensure that the model produces useful information even when the given assets are inadequate
for the given movement requirements. The alternative of using an inelastic model (i.e., a
model with hard constraints that insist upon complete on-time delivery) is inferior because
it would report infeasibility without giving any insight about what can be done with the
assets available.
A useful modeling excursion that is made possible by the elastic variables is to vary the
number of time periods. As the horizon is shortened, it is interesting to observe the increase
in lateness and non-delivery.
As noted, the model's anticipated use is in cases when the airlift assets are insufficient
for full on-time delivery. In the opposite case, the model will be governed by the fourth
term of the objective function, which rewards asset preservation for the reasons given in
Section 2.
Some care must be taken in selecting the lateness and non-delivery penalties and the
aircraft preservation rewards to ensure consistency. Late delivery should be preferred to
non-delivery. The weights will be consistent with this preference provided the late penalty
10
(per ston per day) is less than the corresponding non-delivery penalty (per ston) divided
by the maximum allowed lateness (in days).
3.6 Formulation of the Constraints
As noted in the conceptual model, there are five categories of constraints. Their mathe-
matical formulations are as follows.
3.6.1 Demand Satisfaction Constraints
There are four different kinds of demand constraints, corresponding to troops and the three
classes of cargo (bulk, over-sized and out-sized). Separate constraints are required for the
different cargo types to ensure cargo-carrier compatibility. For example, a carrier of over-
sized cargo cannot be used to carry the larger out-sized cargo. On the other hand, it is
possible to use a carrier of out-sized cargo to carry over-sized cargo. The model accounts
for this asymmetry.
The demand constraints also account for the desired delivery time-windows by use of
the index sets Tuar and the lateness parameters DaysLateuart .
Demand Satisfaction Constraints for All Classes of Cargo:
Y J2 Yl TonsUEuart + UENoGou = MoveUEu Vu with MoveUEu >
Demand Satisfaction Constraints for Out-Sized Cargo:
Y^ Yl S TonsUEuart + UENoGou > ProOutu • MoveUEu
a€Aout r£Rau t£Tuar
Vw with MoveUEu >
Demand Satisfaction Constraints for Over-Sized Cargo:
Y Y Y TonsUEuart + UENoGou > {ProOveru + ProOut^) MoveUEu
Vw with MoveUEu >
Demand Satisfaction Constraints for Troops:
Y J2 Yl TPAXuart + PAXNoGou = MovePAXu Vw with MovePAXu >
a r£Rau teTuar
*
3.6.2 Aircraft Balance Constraints
There are five kinds of aircraft balance constraints enforced for each aircraft type in each
time period. At origin airfields, they ensure that the number of aircraft assigned for delivery
missions plus those inventoried for later use plus those put in the released status equal the
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number inventoried from the previous period plus recoveries from earlier missions and the
new supply of aircraft that is allocated to the origin.
The meaning of releasing, or de-allocating, an airplane in period t is that it is not flown
on any missions from period t through the end of the horizon. In practice, the analyst can
interpret a release in the model's solution in a variety of ways. It can mean, as in the case
of the civilian CRAF aircraft, that the plane is literally sent back to its owner, but not
necessarily. The aircraft can also be kept in the mobility system, available as a replacement
in case of breakdowns or for unforeseen demands.
The second kind of aircraft balance constraints concerns destinations. They are similar
to the first kind except releases are not allowed and the roles of delivery and recovery
missions are reversed. The third kind of aircraft balance constraint ensures that if any new
planes become available in period t, they are allotted appropriately among the origins. There
is a potential gain in efficiency to allow the optimizer to make these allocation decisions,
rather than relying on the user to preassign them to origin airfields. The fourth type
of aircraft balance constraints is a set of accounting equations for defining the NPlanesat
variables based on cumulative allocations and releases.
In the following constraints we use the notation [CTimear } to denote CTnnear rounded
to the nearest integer.
Aircraft Balance Constraints at Origin Airfields:
Y Y Xuart + Hait + Reieasean = Hai ^_i + Aiiotait + Y2 Y Yart ' Va ' z ^
u rSDft, reftal t' + [CTimear \ = t
Aircraft Balance Constraints at Destination Airfields:
Y Yart + HPakt = HPakt-l + J2 Y Y X™rt ' Vfl 'M
r£RRk u r£Rak f€TUQr
t' +{CTimear ]=t
Aircraft Balance Constraints for Allocations to Origin Airfields:
t t
Y Y Allotaif < Y Supp ly<it' Va > t
r = i i t'=\
The following constraint is in the cumulative form, rather than in the simpler form
J2 Z Allotatt < Supplyat , to allow aircraft that become available in period t to be put into
service at a later period.
Aircraft Balance Constraints Accounting for Allocations and Releases:
NPlanesa t = Y2 Y, Allotait > - V^ V^ Releaseait / Va, t
t' = \ i t' = \ i
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The fifth and final set of aircraft balance constraints helps to correct the discretization
error that can result from rounding CTimear to [CTimear ]. the nearest integer, in the
other balance constraints. For example, suppose CTimeaT is less than half a day for some
aircraft a and route r. When this time is rounded to zero in the balance constraints of the
route's origin and destination, these constraints unrealistically permit an unlimited number
of missions per day on that route. Solving the model with this deficiency would yield overly
optimistic results.
One way to fix this problem would be to insist that CTimear be rounded up to a
higher integer. Then the model would be overly pessimistic, because it would rule out the
possibility of an aircraft flying two or more missions in a day even when this is possible.
This sort of problem is common in mathematical modeling whenever time is discretized.
The approach taken here is to enforce the following additional constraints, based on the
cumulative plane-days available.
Cumulative Aircraft Balance Constraints:
t t t t
n
kt>E £ £#ar«'X«art' + E E 'Kartt>YarV + E E H-* + E E HP«
r£Ra t'=z\ u r£Ra t' = l i t'—l k t'=\
<
^2 NPlanesat > Va, t
t'=\
where
t - t' + 1 if t' < t < t' + CTimear - 1
\ CTimear if t > t' + CTimear — 1
The right-hand-side indicates the cumulative number of plane-days available for type a
aircraft up to day t. The left-hand-side accounts for all possible plane activities up to day
t, whether flying or inventoried. The inventory terms are straightforward. The delivery
and recovery terms work as follows: if a delivery initiated on day t' is completed by the
end of day t, then the entire time CTimear (which may be integer or fractional) is included
in the left-hand-side of the cumulative balance constraint for day t. On the other hand,
if a delivery initiated on day t' is not completed by the end of day t, then only the time
expended so far, t — t' -+- 1, is counted in the day t constraint.
An experiment attesting to the value of the cumulative aircraft balance constraints is
reported in [Morton, Rosenthal, and Lim, 1996]. If the CTimear 's were all integer, these
constraints would be redundant and could be omitted.
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3.6.3 Aircraft Capacity Constraints
Troop Carriage Capacity Constraints:
TPAXuarl < MaxPAXa Xuart Vu,a,r, t : t € TuaT
Maximum Payload Constraints:
TonsUEuart + PAXWt- TPAXuart < MaxLoadar Xuart \/u,a,?\t : t € Tuar
Cargo Floor-Space Constraints:
PAXSqFta TPAXuart + UESqFtu TonsUEuart < ACSqFta LoadEffa Xuart
Vu, a,r,t : t £ Tuar
3.6.4 Aircraft Utilization Constraints
The aircraft utilization constraints ensure that the total flying hours consumed by the fleets
of each aircraft type over the planning horizon are within AMC's established utilization
rates [Wilson, 1985; Gearing et. a/., -1988]. These rates are meant to capture spares avail-
ability, aircraft reliability, crew availability, and other factors. The utilization constraints
are formulated by comparing the flying hours consumed by an aircraft fleet in delivery
and recovery flights to the maximum achievable flying hours for the fleet according to the
utilization rate.
y] y~" 2_. FltTimear Xuart + Y^ V^ FltTimear Yart < Y~^ URatea NPlanesat Va
u r£Ra t€Tuar r£Ra t t
As an illustration of the above equation, consider a fleet of 5 aircraft of the same type
made available from day 11. If the utilization rate for this aircraft type is 10 flying hours
per aircraft per day and the horizon is 30 days, then the maximum achievable flight time
1000 hours (10 hours/plane-day x 20 days x 5 planes). This total may not be exceeded
for the whole fleet over the entire planning horizon, however, it is not unusual for a subset
of aircraft to exceed utilization rates over a subset of the horizon, particularly during the
early (surge) stage of a deployment.
3.6.5 Aircraft Handling Capacity of Airfields (MOG Constraint)
The aircraft handling constraints at airfields, commonly called MOG constraints, are per-
haps the most difficult to model. This is because of two complicating factors that necessitate
approximations. First, there is no airfield capacity data available that provides separate
accounting of parking spaces and all the various services (refueling, maintenance, etc.). The
MOG data provided by the Air Force is an approximation, attempting to aggregate all these
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services. Thus, the units of MOGCapbt are an idealized notion of airfield parking spaces
(normalized to narrow-body sized aircraft), not a precisely defined physical quantity.
The second complicating factor in modeling airfield capacity is the congestion caused
by the uncertainty of arrival times and ground times. A deterministic, time-discretized
optimization model cannot accurately treat events occurring within a time period. For
example, suppose the time period of the model is one day and an airfield has 20 landings
per day. How much congestion occurs depends on when the landings occur during the day,
a phenomenon not captured in the daily model. The MOG efficiency factor MOGEff is
introduced to cushion the effect of not explicitly modeling uncertainty. In Section 6, we
describe a stochastic programming model that more directly handles aircraft reliability and
its effect on airfield capacity. The MOG constraints are formulated for each airfield and
time period as follows:
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Dimensional analysis is useful for understanding these constraints. The right-hand-
side is in the units of narrow-body parking spaces, because MOGCapbt is in those units
and MOGEffbt is dimensionless. The first term on the left-hand-side accounts for airfield
capacity consumed by all delivery missions that pass through airfield b during period t.
The second term on the left does the same thing for recovery missions. The dimension of
MOGReqab is narrow-body parking spaces per plane, the dimension of GTimeabr/2A is days,
and the dimensions of Xuart > and Yart > are planes per day; thus, the MOG constraints are
dimensionally balanced.
Aircraft inventoried at origin or destination airfields do not consume any MOG capacity
in the above formulation. This is not a mathematical limitation, but rather a modeling
choice taken because inventoried planes do not consume ground services. It can be easily
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4 Fleet-Mix Tradeoff Analysis
Prior to the C-17 Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) decision in November. 1995, there were
a number of fleet options being considered as replacements for the aging C-141 fleet. These
included "pure" C-17 fleets, as well as mixed fleets that included not only C-17s, but also
a number of Non-Developmental Airlift Aircraft (NDAA), a Boeing 747-400F assigned the
USAF designation C-33. THRUPUT IPs first "operational" test supported the analysis
required by the C-17 DAB.
Although many criteria must be considered when designing a fleet mix. a principal con-
sideration is the ability to deliver the U.S. mobility requirements in support of our National
Defense Strategy - currently two nearly-simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies (2-
MRC's). Since THRUPUT II was designed to study strategic airlift, a two theater mobility
study was a natural application of the model.
In the 2-MRC scenario, much of the cargo being flown from CONUS to the theaters is
considered "outsized" equipment, such as tanks or helicopters. Outsized cargo is problem-
atic, since it can only fit on certain widebody aircraft, such as the C-5 or C-17. The C-33 is
a hybrid in this regard; it can carry some, but not all types of outsized cargo. THRUPUT
IPs features are well suited to contrast the capabilities of the long range, high payload C-
33, with the more versatile, but smaller C-17. It was conceivable that THRUPUT II would
show the lifting capability of a modest C-33 fleet could move most of the bulk and oversize
cargo, allowing C-5's to satisfy the outsize requirement. Alternatively, the results might
show that the demand for outsized cargo movement dominates, and that the C-5 must be
supplemented with C-17's to meet that requirement.
An additional fleet mix tradeoff involves the consumption of ground resources. The
C-17 is designed to onload and offload quickly in an austere environment, while the C-33 is
principally an airliner, and requires longer runways and a more robust support infrastruc-
ture. However, unless refueled in flight, the C-17 needs to stop more frequently than a C-33,
which could offset any advantage derived from its reduced ground requirements. These two
contrasting aspects of C-17 and C-33 resource utilization could interplay so as to give one
aircraft considerable advantage in a contingency.
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Cargo loading and airfield utilization are just two of a myriad of issues surrounding the
procurement of any new airlifter. Without detailed modeling and simulation, the C-17 DAB
could not hope to make an informed choice based on objective criteria. However, unlike
previous boards, this time the analysis included results provided by a detailed LP.
4.1 Input
THRUPUT IPs input requirements are generalized into four categories: 1) unit, 2) airfield,
3) aircraft, and 4) route data. The source of the unit movement requirements is called the
Time-Phased Force Deployment Data, or TPFDD. This highly detailed list of equipment
and personnel is intended to identify everything necessary to carry out our national strategy.
Consequently, it can be quite detailed and extremely long. In fact, the TPFDD used in this
analysis initially consisted of more than 21,000 entries. Modeling each of these entries as
a THRUPUT II unit was unthinkable, given current computational limitations. Through
careful screening and consolidation (see Section 5). the TPFDD was reduced to just over
200 entries, each of which was read into THRUPUT II as a unit. From the pared TPFDD,
we examined the origins (Aerial Ports of Embarkation-APOE's), and destinations (Aerial
Ports of Debarkation-APOD's) and attempted to set up a realistic enroute basing scheme
that could support the movement.
The primary guidance for this airfield and TPFDD information was the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, J8 force structure analysis called the Mobility Requirements Study, Bottom-Up Re-
view Update, MRS-BURU [Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995]. Its results were driven by a specific
2-MRC TPFDD, considered to be the most widely accepted requirements listing in exis-
tence. This report not only identified the who, what, when, and where of every movement
requirement, but also listed the available airfields, including their relative capacities for air
cargo traffic flow. MRS-BURU is credited for providing the motivation for upgrading the
U.S. airlift fleet.
Compared with unit and airfield information, aircraft and route data were relatively
straightforward to gather. Although an aircraft's effect on the airlift system is contentious,
its performance characteristics are largely objective and easily derived. Route data pre-
sented a more difficult, yet not insurmountable challenge. Relying only on currently es-
tablished AMC routing condemns the model to favor aircraft whose payload-range char-
acteristics resemble the current fleet. Allowing THRUPUT II the latitude to choose new
routes based on an aircraft's unique capabilities was preferable, so we offered many more
route- aircraft combinations than might seem necessary at first glance. The tradeoff between
making sufficient routes available and model tractability is discussed in [Toy, 1996].
In addition to the airlift system parameters, there were several subjective factors to
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consider when setting up the scenario. One such factor was the MaxLate parameter, which
establishes how late a unit can arrive before incurring an extremely large nondelivery (no-
go) penalty. Increasing MaxLate naturally allows more overall cargo to be delivered, but
has the unfortunate effect of dramatically increasing the size of the LP, since there are
more feasible movement options. However, the need to keep the model small must be
balanced with a reasonable estimate of when "late" becomes "too late" from an operational
standpoint. For the purposes of this work, MaxLate was set at 8 days, meaning any cargo
or passengers that could not be moved by the Required Delivery Date (RDD) + 8 would
be considered not delivered and cause the maximum penalty to be charged. Fortunately,
the 8-day maximum affected all excursions similarly, thus mitigating any relative advantage
attributable to this subjectivity when comparing fleet mixes.
As with all analyses, preparing the above inputs took vast amounts of time. However,
we believe many of these inputs are not scenario specific, and can be re-used in a variety of
studies with little adjustment.
4.2 Analysis
THRUPUT IPs C-17 / NDAA analysis was conducted parametrically by running each
proposed fleet mix as a separate LP. The performance of each fleet was evaluated primarily
by how much of the movement requirement (cargo and passengers) was delivered in a timely
manner. Examining unit "closure" in this way, we were able to identify several significant
differences between fleets. One such difference is illustrated by Figures 1A and IB. In these
figures, days from the "kickoff" of the first contingency are given on the horizontal axis.
Baseline Delivery Profile
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The two plots show the cumulative amount of cargo moved to date (stons), contrasted with
the cumulative amount of cargo required to date. Figure 1A corresponds to the baseline
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fleet mix for the study. Figure IB corresponds to one of the alternative fleet options under
consideration.
Ideally, the airlift fleet should be able to accommodate the entire demand on time.
However, given the non-uniform nature of the TPFDD requirements, all of the fleets ex-
amined had difficulty recovering from extremely large spikes in demand. The fleet used in
the baseline case falls behind early and experiences great difficulty catching up with the
requirement. However, the fleet used in Excursion 2 experiences only brief lags in the cargo
delivery. It was more able to move cargo early, and hence stayed ahead of the imminent
demand surges.
Another key metric used to evaluate the different fleets was the relative proportions of
on-time, late, and undelivered cargo and passengers. Figures 2A and 2B detail the results for
the 5 cases examined. While all of the cases delivered similar amounts of on-time cargo, total
cargo delivered (including late deliveries) varied significantly - notably between Excursion
1, and Excursions 2, 3, and 4. Interestingly, a comparison of the two figures shows that as
the airlift fleet was tailored to improve cargo delivery, the number of passengers delivered
went down. As a result, it appears that none of the proposed fleets dominate with respect
to both cargo and passenger delivery.
During the course of our output analysis, we were unexpectedly enlightened by what
began as a casual look at the marginals, or "shadow prices" associated with an optimal
solution. Although not a key aspect of the study, airfield size played an enormous role in the
overall performance of each of the fleets. The output revealed that relatively small changes in
the airfield's capacity at key enroute and destination airfields would yield disproportionate
changes in system performance. Moreover, these key bases differed depending on which
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airfields considerably more than fleets with many C-33's. Conversely, excursions with a large-
number of C-33's relied heavily on destination airfield size, but did not require as extensive
an enroute infrastructure due to their longer range. Given the performance characteristics of
the two aircraft, this insight is not surprising, but the quantification of an airfield's marginal
value is a great benefit of optimization that is unavailable in simulation. Moreover, this
discovery clearly emphasized that a fleet mix decision is not one to be made in isolation.
All aspects of the airlift system, including such factors as airfield infrastructure must be
considered when choosing a mix of aircraft. They are not independent; treating them as
such risks providing decision makers with skewed information about a critical piece of our
nation's mobility force.
The analysis described here, performed by the THRUPUT II team in support of the
1995 C-17 / NDAA DAB decision, is indicative of the type of insight that can be provided
by this LP to a decision maker. We have elected to emphasize this theme rather than
delve into the scenario and excursion specific details such as fleet composition and basing
structure. However, one aspect of this project that does demand closer description involves
the methods used to reduce such a- large (indeed initially intractable) linear program to a
manageable size.
5 Model Refinements for Implementation
5.1 Model Reduction
One of the key issues regarding implementation of optimization modeling, particularly in
military applications, is the balancing of realism vs. tractability.
No mathematical model can ever be totally realistic. The optimization modeling process
is itself a constrained optimization problem. The objective of the process is to maximize
the amount of realism achieved, subject to the limitations on computational tractability.
Regardless of the rapid rate of advances in computing, we will always be faced with finite
limits on tractability and hence never achieve total realism. The question is: how much
realism can one achieve with the resources at hand?
THRUPUT II has decision variables with as many as four indices, such as Xuart , so
the crux of the balancing problem is the number of (u,a,r, £)-tuples included in any real
instance of the model. In general, the more tuples allowed, the more realistic the model, but
the more difficult it is to solve. The number of tuples depends on, first, how many of each
index type exists (how many units, aircraft types, routes and time periods are modeled),
and, second, what rules are used for allowing or prohibiting any (u,a,r, t) combination from
being considered. These two aspects of model reduction are discussed next.
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5.1.1 Aggregation
The number of units, aircraft types, routes and time periods in the instances we ran of the
model were chosen with a great deal of attention to the issues raised above. Distasteful as it
may seem, a certain amount of aggregation of entities is needed in any real-world modeling
project. In this case, the most significant aggregation took place in the generation of
airfields, units and time periods. Aggregation of airfields implies, in turn, a limit on the
number of available routes.
The airfield and unit aggregation rules are formalized in the NPS Masters thesis of
[Turker, 1995]. Turker developed a location-theoretic optimization model for airfield aggre-
gation, but in the case of the C-17/NDAA study, the USAF aviators on our team just used
military judgement to decide which airfields to aggregate. In the end, the infrastructure of
the 2-MRC scenario was represented by 29 airfields.
The routes generated over the selected airfields were the product of a combination
of Turker's Pascal program and the oversight of the aviators. The program used a tree
structure to consider possible routes and screened them for inclusion based on various
rules. The rules included: critical leg length of the aircraft, required crew rest or crew
change, deviation of route length from great circle distance, aircraft/airfield compatibility
(the civilian reserve fleet has landing restrictions not imposed on military aircraft and vice
versa), and others. The oversight step was particularly intriguing, because Turker (a Turkish
naval officer) had no access to the real names and locations of the airfields when developing
and testing the route generation program. Some routes had to be added or deleted based
on understanding of the actual situation. The final result of this process was the inclusion
of 313 routes for the entire scenario.
As stated in Section 4, the TPFDD file we were given for the C-17/NDAA analysis had
over 21,000 movement requirements. This data set was first screened for the deletion of
extremely small requirements. Then it was aggregated by assuming two movement require-
ments could be merged if the following conditions held: they had the same type of cargo
(or passengers) to be moved, they had the same origin and destination (after airfield aggre-
gations), and they had nearly simultaneous RDD's. The definition of "nearly simultaneous
RDD's" was governed by a set of user-supplied parameters, which enforced simultaneity
less rigorously as we went further out towards the horizon.
Aggregation of time is always a delicate issue in optimization modeling. Time has
to be discretized, and nothing has a more direct effect on model size than the choice of
time discretization units. For the C17/NDAA study, we chose to divide time into two-day
time periods, of which there were 47. Using 94 one-day time periods was intractable. See
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[Morton, Rosenthal, Lim, 1996] for an experiment on a single-MRC scenario, which showed
that the cumulative aircraft, balance constraints in Section 3.6.2 help lessen the effect of
time discretization.
5.1.2 Variable Elimination and Sparsity
An algebraic modeling language such as GAMS is very conducive to implementing rules
for limiting the number of admissible combinations of indices. In the case of the (u,a,r, t)
tuples mentioned above, an Xuart variable is allowed to exist if all the following conditions
hold:
• route r flies from unit w's origin to its destination
• aircraft type a can fly on route r with an acceptable payload
• the start time, t, of the mission is after unit u's available-to-load date
• the arrival time, if the mission starts at time t, is on or before RDD(u) + MaxLate
• there is a match between some cargo type (or passengers) that aircraft type a can
carry and unit u's movement requirement
• aircraft of type a must be available at the origin of route r at time t
These rules are evaluated once for each tuple and stored in a GAMS dynamic set. This
set is referenced when the constraints are generated in order to achieve as much model
sparsity as possible. The set is also used to eliminate other variables. For example, the
aircraft inventory variables at destination airfields, HPakt, cannot exist unless some aircraft
of type a can potentially arrive at airfield k prior to time t.
There were other dynamic sets in THRUPUT II. In our experience with real-world
optimization models, a serious investment of development time in the fine-tuning of dynamic
sets for implementing model reduction rules can have a big payoff in tractability.
5.2 Computational Experience
After using the aggregations and reductions noted above, the model runs required for the
C-17/NDAA study had the following problem dimensions: 200 units, 7 (or fewer) aircraft
types, 47 time periods and 29 airfields. The resulting model sizes and solution times are
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given below:
Scenario Rows Columns Non-zeros Solve time
Baseline 161,000 183,000 1.9 million 2.98 hrs
Excursion 1 124,000 142,000 1.5 million 1.95 hrs
Excursion 2 154,000 177,000 1.9 million 2.57 hrs
Excursion 3 154,000 177,000 1.9 million 3.14 hrs
Excursion 4 154,000 177,000 1.9 million 2.48 hrs
These runs were performed with GAMS as the problem generator and CPLEX 3.0
[CPLEX Optimization Inc., 1994] as the solver on an IBM RS6000/590 workstation. These
rather large-scale linear programs presented a challenge. There were, in fact, several un-
successful early attempts. We were very fortunate to be able to get advice from CPLEX
Optimization, Inc. [Lowe, 1995] on solver settings. We sent them, via FTP over the Inter-
net, a file containing a 3 million non-zero instance of the model, which they were able to
solve. (This was when most but not all of the variable eliminations and sparsity refinements
were implemented, so they have solved an even larger LP than the ones reported above.)
The key advice from the CPLEX people was to use the barrier (interior point) algorithm,
with tolerances and options tuned for this particular model.
5.3 Output
Each run of THRUPUT II for the C-17/NDAA study produced large amounts of output
data. This profusion of information was too much for an analyst to absorb, so it had to be
organized in relevant summary reports of the optimal solution. Since the linear programs
took a long time to solve, we made sure that all the optimal solution information was stored
in readily accessed files. Then, a separate GAMS reporting program could be run many
times against the same optimal solution. This proved to be useful because the AFSAA
analysts often thought of new ideas for interesting summary reports while analyzing the old
ones. Among the most widely used reports were:
• Total number of delivery missions flown, by aircraft type.
• Total number of missions flown, by route.
• For each unit, the closure date (date of last delivery if unit is fully delivered) displayed
next to the ALD and RDD, along with the total amounts delivered on-time, late and
not at all.
• For each MRC and time period, cumulative deliveries vs. requirements, separated by
bulk, oversize, outsize and passengers.
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• For each airfield, a report on MOG utilization, summarized as the number of days
when MOG use exceeds P percent of capacity for P = 10,25,50,75,90,95, and 100.
6 Model Extensions
6.1 Solution by Cascade
Although the difficulties associated with solving a large THRUPUT II model can be partially
redressed by the model reduction techniques just described, ongoing research at the Naval
Postgraduate School demonstrates that THRUPUT II may be solved in a piecemeal manner,
thus greatly increasing the allowable problem size. This section describes that effort.
Consider how a scheduler would approach the 2-MRC scenario. Meticulously optimizing
all aircraft, loading, and route decisions over the entire scenario length is impossible for at
least two reasons: 1) future uncertainty makes gathering accurate data for the latter periods
of a scenario problematic, and 2) a sufficiently long contingency overloads the scheduler's
ability to reconcile the myriad of decisions. A modeler formulating a linear program faces the
same difficulties, namely incorporating the increasing problem size with decreasing certainty
as the length of the scenario grows. For either scheduler or modeler, perhaps the most
straightforward way of dealing with the difficulties incurred by a large scenario is to focus
sequentially on a subset of the scenario's periods, then move forward in time to a new subset.
This temporal "myopia" degrades the solution quality, but makes the problem simpler
to solve. Moreover THRUPUT II, which is used to mimic scheduling, but not produce
schedules, is more "accurate" if it can incorporate the realism of nearsighted scheduling. For
example, when choosing fleet size or infrastructure for use in future mobility contingencies,
THRUPUT II ideally wishes to optimize given the current scheduling capabilities, instead
of a Utopian capability. A truly optimal schedule generated by THRUPUT II might alter
decisions made at the outset of a contingency based on specific delivery requirements several
weeks later. This is unrealistic, and can be avoided by reducing the ability of the formulation
to look so far ahead.
The temporal cascade heuristic applied to THRUPUT II proceeds by solving for all
variables and constraints whose domain is defined for the first 20 (for example) periods.
Thus missions are flown so as to minimize delivery penalties in the first 20 periods, subject
to the constraints applicable in those periods. Then, the process is cascaded forward in
time to solve for a later set of periods. Mathematically, this implies generating a feasible
solution by successively solving for only a subset of rows and columns, then moving to a set
of rows and columns corresponding to later time periods. Each of these subproblems should
overlap the previously solved subproblem in order to minimize the end effects caused by the
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former's temporal limitation. Fortunately, this methodology is facilitated by the structure
of THRUPUT II. Variables and constraints in this model directly affect only nearby time
periods. For example, missions flown on day 5 of a scenario have a large impact on the
missions that can be flown on day 7, but only a minor impact on the missions that can be
flown on day 25. This characteristic manifests itself as an overlapping "staircase" along the
main diagonal of an LP's constraint coefficient matrix. The width of the overlap gives the
number of time periods directly affected by the decisions (variable levels) made in a given
time period. The rest of the coefficient matrix is relatively sparse, since variables (columns)
associated with the early time periods rarely appear in constraints (rows) corresponding
to the later time periods. This well known methodology is known as either the rolling
horizon, or temporal cascade heuristic. However, the heuristic is sparsely documented, and
is theoretically incomplete, since no scheme to bound the solution quality has been offered.
The quality of the solution produced by the temporal cascade heuristic is dependent
on many scenario specific factors, and cannot be stated theoretically for most problems.
However, a bound on the solution quality may be derived by exploiting information derived
from this heuristic solution. Since a given time period is only directly linked to a few
adjacent time periods, relaxing the rows associated with these nearby periods can separate
subproblems out of an otherwise linked model. As with most decompositions however, the
success of this scheme is dependent on the ability to compute accurate prices for resource
consumption of the relaxed constraints. With such prices, a Lagrangian penalty can be
applied to the subproblems, and a lower bound can be derived. Often, price selection
is computationally intensive, which makes Lagrangian methods undesirable. However, in
this case, reasonable prices are readily available from the temporal cascade heuristic just
computed.
The temporal cascade heuristic offers a way to produce a more realistic schedule than
a truly optimal one. It also greatly reduces the tractability problems associated with the
large models demanded by mobility planners. Finally, the cost of scheduling myopia may
be estimated by solving a series of relaxed subproblems. For these reasons, the method
shows great promise for use with THRUPUT II [Baker, 1997].
6.2 Incorporating Aircraft Reliability
Aircraft reliability is an important factor in the ability of the airlift system to deliver troops
and materiel in a timely fashion. The current fleet has a mix of planes with differing
reliability characteristics. For example, the C5 requires unscheduled maintenance on ap-
proximately 15% of its landings while the rate for the newer (and smaller) C17 fleet is under
7% (1994 peace-time data, AMC). Broken aircraft reduce the lift capability of the system
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by reducing the size of the effective fleet. In addition, aircraft requiring unscheduled main-
tenance and repairs reduce throughput by consuming scarce resources (e.g., maintenance,
crew-duty hours, ramp space) that might otherwise contribute to on-time deliveries.
Simulation models for airlift systems are attractive because they can incorporate high
levels of detail such as tracking individual aircraft and incorporating unscheduled main-
tenance and repairs. However, simulation models typically use naive aircraft routing and
scheduling rules; as a result, it is possible to provide a simulation model with additional
resources (e.g., more aircraft or routing options) and yet have system performance degrade.
Linear programming models use more aggregate representations of the airlift fleet and in-
frastructure and do not incorporate uncertainty. However, due to optimal scheduling and
routing, linear programming models better lend themselves to analysis of system bottle-
necks by providing marginal values on specific resources, and in some cases, LP models may
be more appropriate for comparing system performance under different sets of resources.
A stochastic optimization model for strategic airlift combines the ability of a simulation
to include uncertain aircraft ground times with an LP's ability to optimally schedule and
route aircraft. However, the resulting stochastic optimization model is typically very large
and requires special-purpose optimization software. We have extended the LP model of
Section 3 to incorporate aircraft reliability (Goggins, 1995]. The model is identical to the
deterministic model except that the ground time GTIMEabr which appears in the airfield
capacity constraint (Section 3) is replaced with a discrete random variable and the modified
constraint includes an elastic decision variable which allows the constraint to be violated at
a certain cost.
Mathematically, these modifications can be summarized as follows. Let u> denote a
specific ground-time scenario (such as a scenario where a C-5A breaks, and its repair time
is 7 hours), and let pgt be the probability of observing scenario u for a particular base b
and time t. GTIME^ represents the "effective ground time'" spent by aircraft a at base
b when flying route r under ground time scenario to, and MOGPENbt is the unit penalty
for violating the airfield capacity at base b in time t. The elastic decision variable Kg
t
>
denotes the amount by which capacity is exceeded at airfield b in time t under scenario
u>. The new airfield capacity constraints and the additional objective function term are
specified below:
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Airfield Capacity Constraint when Aircraft have Random Ground Times:
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The stochastic optimization model has been solved for the modest-sized data set in
[Lim, 1994] which has 20 units, 7 aircraft types, 17 airfields, and 30 time periods. Three
of the seven aircraft were modeled as having random ground times (C5, C17, and C141)
and we assumed each aircraft type breaks independently. Ground times were approximated
by discrete distributions with 9 realizations for each aircraft type, resulting in 9 3 = 729
realizations for each base 6 and time t combination. The resulting stochastic model increases
the number of airfield capacity constraints by a factor of 729 over the deterministic model
from 30 17 = 510 to 371790. There are an equal number of additional decision variables of
type R
t^
. We solved the stochastic model with a Benders' decomposition algorithm. While
the total number of constraints in the stochastic model is greater by a factor of more than
50, the increase in running time over the deterministic model is a factor of 12 (20 minutes
to 100 seconds on an IBM RS6000 590 workstation) [Goggins, 1995].
Since the linear and stochastic programming models contain more aggregate representa-
tions of the airlift system, we examined whether the schedules proposed by these optimiza-
tion models were "flyable" in a more detailed simulation. We developed a discrete-event
stochastic simulation model that took as input the output of these mathematical programs;
specifically, the simulation model attempts to execute a proposed aircraft routing schedule.
The strategy of coupling optimization and simulation models in this way is very attractive:
Confidence can be gained in the optimization model as certain parameters are tuned (as
we describe below) and the performance of the simulation can be improved since naive
scheduling rules are replaced with those proposed by an optimization model.
Our experimental results on the modest-sized data set of [Lim, 1994] compared schedules
proposed by the linear and stochastic programming models. During the peak demand
periods, we observed a 10% increase in cargo and troop deliveries when the simulation model
executed schedules proposed by the stochastic program. Because the stochastic optimization
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model is larger and more difficult to solve (and cannot currently be solved within algebraic
modeling languages such as GAMS), it is desirable to "tune' 1 the deterministic optimization
model so that it yields delivery schedules that are achievable in the simulation model. As
described in Section 3, controlling the "MOG efficiency value" MOGEff is one way to
achieve this. We empirically determined that a MOGEff value of 0.80 gave deterministic
optimization schedules that were "flyable" in the stochastic simulation.
7 Conclusions
THRUPUT II is an optimization model of the airlift mobility system that has proven
useful to Air Force analysts in an important acquisition study. The Air Force analytical
community has in the past put much more reliance on simulation than on optimization.
This is in contrast to civilian industries, such as petroleum, electronics, airlines, forestry
and many others, where optimization is very widely used.
While we were developing THRUPUT II, a similar and concurrent effort was under
way at the RAND Corporation. The CONOP model of [Killingsworth and Melody, 1994]
is also a GAMS-based, multi-period linear programming model for airlift optimization. It
has some features not found in THRUPUT II. In May, 1996, the NPS and RAND groups
started a joint effort to develop a new optimization model with the best features of both
THRUPUT II and CONOP. The new model is called the NPS/RAND Mobility Optimizer
(NRMO). Among NRMO's features that are not modeled in THRUPUT II are:
• The use of tankers for aerial refueling, and the facility for some tankers to change
roles between refueling and cargo hauling.
• The modeling of shuttle flights and ground transportation in theater: some units have
the option of direct delivery vs. transshipment, and some aircraft have the option of
changing roles between strategic carriers and shuttlers.
• Detailed flow balance and utilization constraints for crews.
• The modeling of recovery bases, so that aircraft arriving in theater have the option
of receiving services and crew changes at some other airfield besides the MRC's main
port of debarkation.
The NRMO model is currently in use in a study of airfield infrastructure and in a large
Pacific scenario. The detailed formulation of NRMO and the results of these studies will be
given in a future report.
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